Second, steel is an almost ubiquitous industrial product while automobile production is heavily concentrated in North America, Europe, and Japan. In the past decade, moreover, the Japanese have vaulted ahead of the rest of the world, particularly in smaller cars. As a result, import restraints aimed solely at Japanese automobiles can be quite effective in Europe or in the United States because there are no ready substitutes for them from other parts of the world. Implicit quotas on Japanese cars in Europe and explicit quotas on Japanese automobile exports to the United States have not induced large diversions of exports in either direction across the North Atlantic. On the other hand, quotas
1. A number of steel exporters, including Canada, Taiwan, Argentina, and Sweden, remain outside the formal voluntary agreement although implicit understandings may exist with some of them. Altogether, there are twenty-five countries exporting steel to the United States without a formal agreement.
2. For a review of the effects of past attempts to provide industries with breathing room through temporary trade protection, see Robert Z. Lawrence and Paula R. DeMasi, on steel from a limited number of steel exporters simply induce an expansion of exports from other countries. There are more than a score of major steel exporters and perhaps another twenty to thirty who can increase their exports to the United States when others are restrained. Limiting steel imports from countries in the European Community (EC) and from Japan will predictably increase imports from Brazil, Taiwan, or Canada.3
For these reasons, one would expect restraints on Japanese automobiles to be far more effective than those on steel, and in fact they have been.
The Effectiveness of Steel Import Restraints
The steel industry restraints date from the closing days of the Johnson administration. Quotas were negotiated first with Japanese, then with European, producers. The limitations on exports to the United States became effective in 1969 and were extended to 1974, but they appear to have been binding only in 1971-72 for most products. Earlier research showed that these limits raised U.S. steel prices 1.2 to 3.5 percent in 1971-72.4 The next episode of U.S. steel protection involved trigger prices, or a floor under import prices. Trigger prices, set equal to the estimated costs of production in Japan plus importation costs, were in effect in 1978-80 and then sporadically in 1981-82. The trigger price program was launched during a period of a depreciating U.S. dollar; hence, it had only a limited effect upon prices in the early stages, raising U.S. producer prices about 1 percent in 1979.5 As the U.S. dollar rose in 1980, U.S. producers threatened and then actually filed a number of trade suits against steel exporters. These suits were suspended, leading to a reimposition of the trigger prices, followed 3. Diversion of a homogeneous producers' good can also occur through third countries. A small amount of steel is currently exported to the United States by a number of countries with no steel mills. Such evasion of the automobile restraint agreement would obviously be impossible because the origin of a Toyota or Nissan cannot be concealed. 
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by new filings of trade suits, and, finally, the abolition of the trigger price system. All these changes created enormous uncertainty among steel exporters.
In 1982, the EC agreed to limit steel exports to the United States in order to settle antidumping and countervailing duty cases brought by U.S. steel producers. Finally, in 1984, President Reagan announced a new set of voluntary restraints to end the Section 201 trade case brought by Bethlehem Steel earlier in the year. These new restraints, which were to include most steel exporting countries, limited finished steel imports to 18.5 percent of the U.S. market for 1985-89 and allowed the importation of another 1.5 million tons of semifinished steel. These restraints were not actually negotiated with most countries until mid-1985.
To place these three episodes of trade protection in perspective, it is useful to examine the trend in import penetration and to compare world export prices with realized U.S. prices during 1970-86 (see table 1). As the dollar rose after 1980, the share of imports in U.S. apparent consumption of steel rose with it. The sudden surge in 1984 was undoubtedly caused by exporters' anticipation that quotas to be negotiated in 1984-85 would be based on recent market shares.
The rising dollar and the EC settlement allowed U.S. producer prices to rise substantially above European spot prices in 1981-84, but this price difference has now begun to narrow with the declining dollar. The import share has fallen only modestly, but it remains at a historically high level despite the quotas. One may conclude, therefore, that threat of further trade restraints and the EC settlement allowed U. S. producers to keep their prices substantially above world levels through 1985, but the quotas negotiated in 1985 may have a much less restrictive effect at the current level of exchange rates.
The Effectiveness of the Automobile Restraints
The automobile restraints were directed solely at Japan. Beginning in April 1981, the Japanese were to limit their exports of passenger cars to the United States to 1.68 million units a year through March 31, 1984. In 1984, the restraints were extended for one year at 1.85 million passenger cars, and in 1985 they were extended again for one year at 2.3 million units. In 1986, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry Further evidence of the differences in effectiveness of the two voluntary restraint regimes may be found in the prices of Japanese imports and domestic automobiles. A simple model of the determinants of the price of a standardized mix of U. S. automobile imports from Japan Bryan and Owen Humpage allow for currency effects, but their results extend only through 1983.9 The strong automobile market in 1984-85 allowed U. S. producers to realize prices far above those they could have sustained if there had been an elastic supply of Japanese imports at a price $2,500 lower than the realized import price in 1984-85. On the other hand, had the U.S. industry been competitive, the prices of imports and domestic cars would probably have risen far less in response to the restraints unless a capacity constraint had been binding. Because the domestic market is so concentrated, the restraints appear to have been a "facilitating" instrument in allowing output restraint among U.S. producers. 10
As the dollar has fallen, the effect of the automobile restraints has diminished. The Japanese continue to limit their exports of automobiles to the United States to 2.3 million units, but a stagnating U.S. market, rising U.S. production of Japanese cars, and the 60 percent appreciation of the yen since 1984 has made the restraints largely irrelevant. Indeed, a recent analysis of U.S. and Japanese production costs suggests that shown little trend since 1977 despite the trade restraints that have been in place for most of the period. But if protection had been effective in raising industry cash flows substantially, and if, for some reason, these additional cash flows or enhanced profit margins had been successful in generating greater investment outlays, the industry would actually be worse off than it is.
Beginning in the early 1970s, the U.S. integrated industry could not profitably invest in major facilities.12 High construction costs, rapidly changing minimill technology, and stagnating steel demand created an environment in which the incremental returns to investment in huge blast furnaces, steel furnaces, and rolling mills were insufficient to cover the cost of capital. Those firms that invested most intensively in modernizing and rounding out their plants during 1975-81, after the large rise in steel prices in 1974, generally suffered the largest losses in market value during the next five years (table 5). Of the top five firms, ranked by investment rate, four have begun bankruptcy proceedings, and one has abandoned all integrated steel facilities. Of the bottom five, only Armco has shown a large loss in market value-because it diversified unsuccessfully into financial services. Thus, to the extent that protection stabilized or raised prices and contributed to the excessive optimism among steelmakers in the mid-1970s, it proved to be extremely counterproductive.
In the automobile industry, real profits have risen steadily since 1982 despite sharply lower domestic sales of vehicles. Profits per unit in 1983-85 were nearly 40 percent above those in 1974-76, when industry output was similar but the dollar was 30 percent lower (table 6). Real investment lagged its late 1970s levels until 1984, when it rose sharply, aided somewhat by Japanese investment in the U.S. automobile industry.
The restraints produced an estimated increase in cash flow of some $6-$8 billion, before leakages into other factor suppliers' rents.13 Thus, between 33 and 45 percent of the 1984-85 auto industry cash flow may be attributed to the restraints, even assuming no effect upon unit sales. This large increment of cash flow, or the analogous rise in profit margins, may have had some effect upon 1985-86 industry investment outlays.
The Response of Labor Costs, Productivity, and Product Quality
Because import restraints reduced competitive pressure from abroad and raised industry prices and profits, they also influenced industry wage bargains. This section examines the trends in labor costs and productivity during the 1970s and 1980s.
WAGES
The steel industry's total compensation first accelerated in the early 1970s with the first restraints and rose rapidly in the late 1970s with the trigger price system (table 7) .14 Since 1982, a year in which average wages rose sharply because of massive layoffs of low-seniority and therefore lower-wage workers, total compensation in the steel industry has fallen, reflecting the declining condition of the industry. Because the 1984 restraints have not had a major effect upon steel prices or profits, they have not been able to stem the decay of real wages in the industry. Moreover, the rise in the minimill share of the industry has brought additional downward pressure on union wages at the integrated companies. 15 In the automobile industry, compensation generally tracked steel compensation until steel wages began their sharp increase in the early 13. This assumes no increase in U.S. output due to the quotas. For a discussion of the output effects, see Winston and Associates, Blind Intersection?, pp. 64-65.
14. In the early 1970s, the industry reached an "experimental negotiating agreement" with the United Steelworkers of America that guaranteed the workers at least 3 percent increases in real wages each year in return for an agreement not to strike. Such an agreement on the part of management presumably reflected its confidence that price competition from imports would not be a major problem. 1970s (table 7) As expected, the capacity variable proves to be important in explaining the recent rise in productivity. Moreover, the residuals from equation 2 show no positive tendency in the 1980s, suggesting that the targeting of investment on modernizing a smaller capacity has had little effect upon productivity.
PRODUCT QUALITY
In recent years, U.S. producers of both steel and automobiles have fallen behind their Japanese counterparts in product quality. The recent decline of the dollar has reduced their production cost disadvantages, but if U.S. producers continue to lag in product quality they may still find it difficult to compete with imports and with products produced by foreigners on U.S. soil.
Among the most important indexes of product quality in automobiles is reliability in use. Data on repair frequencies show that during the mid1970s, the Big Three U. S. producers saw their product reliability decline Source: Based on Consumer Reports, various April issues. a. Simple unweighted average repair frequency rating for each company's most recent models minus the average for all Japanese models based on the following scale: 1 = much better than average; 2 = better than average; 3 = average; 4 = worse than average; 5 = much worse than average. substantially relative to the Japanese (table 8) . A simple regression analysis of these reliability gaps shows that Ford and Chrysler reduced their substantial disadvantage relative to the Japanese on average by approximately 20 percent in 1981-85 and that this reduction is statistically significant. General Motors, by contrast, failed to make statistically significant progress and now has the widest quality gap of the major domestic producers.
In the steel industry, a spate ofjoint ventures with Japanese companies has permitted the U.S. integrated companies to offer quality galvanized steel for automotive applications. But older rolling mills and raw steel facilities are still less able to provide quality products than the facilities of many foreign competitors.
Lessons for Policy
Concern over the ability of U.S. industries to compete in unrestrained international markets has once again raised protectionist sentiment among U.S. lawmakers. In the past, the stated objectives of import quotas or voluntary import restraints was to provide temporary insulation from international competition to allow particularly hard-hit indus- It is unfortunate that much of recent steel policy has been based upon a premise that more investment is required to make the industry healthy. Tying reinvestment of earnings in steel to trade protection in the 1984 Steel Import Stabilization Act is the most recent example of this error. It is bad enough to base trade restrictions upon faulty economic premises; it is even worst to derive further conditionality from these same premises.
AUTOMOBILES
The situation for the automobile industry was not as desperate as that for steel in the 1980s, though without trade protection, Chrysler may have failed, and industry profits would have been extremely low throughout the first half of the 1980s. The voluntary restraints added substantially to automobile company cash flows, but they may not have raised output or employment. Indeed, Winston and his associates find that the restraints raised domestic prices and increased cash flow more than $8 billion per year, but actually reduced industry output 3-4 percent in 1983-84. 18 The welfare cost of the restraints, according to Winston and his associates, was $5 billion to the U.S. economy in 1984, and as much as $2 billion for the United States and Japan combined. 19 That cost peaked in 1984-85 and has fallen substantially since with the decline in the dollar. Had protection been offered in the form of a declining temporary tariff, rather than binding quotas, the U.S. price response may have been lower and the welfare loss to the U.S. economy, less.
Because the restraints allowed the United Auto Workers to maintain their premium over other manufacturing wages and even raise it above its late 1970s level, any cost improvements due to the quotas would have to be due to their effect upon investment and the resultant increases in productivity. Capital investment in the motor vehicle industry accelerated in 1984-85, perhaps in response to the profits derived from quotas. But I can detect no improvement in productivity and only limited progress in U.S. product quality relative to Japanese models.
Another indirect effect of the automobile restraints may prove to be their most lasting benefit. As a result of the restraints, several Japanese companies accelerated plans to build assembly plants in the United States by two to four years. Table 9 lists three plants that are now operating and four that are either under construction or in the planning stages. Of these, only the Honda plant was under development before the restraints were negotiated in 1981. Still, it seems unlikely that 18. Winston and Associates, Blind Intersection?, pp. 64-65.
19. Three billion dollars of the U.S. welfare loss is transfers to the Japanese automobile industry, its factor suppliers, and dealers.
